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A. Pragmatism, flexibility, and the role of law in the GA TT legal
system
There is perhaps no international organization in which law is
viewed as such a hindrance to progress as in the GATIT.
One of the characteristics of public international law is the fact
that it is created to meet social, economic, and political realities. 2 Its
primary actors, the states, are sovereign actors. In exercising their
sovereignty they create rules - treaties as well as rules of customary
law - which they believe are most appropriate to meet their needs
and interests. 3 This characteristic of international law is especially
relevant to international economic law, of which the GATT 4 legal
system is the single most important part.5
* Refendar 1986, Assessor 1989, Dr. jur. 1991, University of Passau; LL.M. 1991,
McGill University. The author is currently an associate with the firm of Sch6n, Nolte,
Finkelburg & Clemm in Brussels.
I K. DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION Xiii-XiV (1970).
2 A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT - THEORIE UND PRAXis 51
(3d ed. 1984).
3 Of course, these interests are generally conflicting. However, the rules laid down
in treaties or by customary international law reflect an agreement or common understand-
ing between states on what the states believe should govern their relationship as a rule of
law. For treaties, this follows directly from the conclusion of the treaty, and for customary
law, it can be concluded from the requirements for its creation, which are a common prac-
tice and opiniojuris of the states participating. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
By introducing this notion of in'ernational law, I do not want to suggest a strict posi-
tivist understanding of international law by saying that international law can only be cre-
ated by an act of a sovereign state. But without engaging in a discussion on the
foundations of international law in general, or international economic law in particular, it
is safe to say that treaties and international customary law are generally accepted as inter-
national law and constitute the main sources of international law. For a discussion on the
legal theory of international economic law, see Petersmann, International Economic Theory
and International Economic Law: On the Tasks of a Legal Theory of International Economic Order, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, Doc-
TRINE AND THEORY 227 (1983).
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-I 1, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (hereinafter GATT or General Agreement).
5 For a definition of international economic law, see D. CARREAU, P. JULIARD, & T.
FLORY, DROIT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIQUE 7-14 (2d ed. 1980) (hereinafter CARREAU); P.
VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 13
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The GATT legal system is often seen as a flexible one with a
very pragmatic approach to the treatment of conflicts between its
contracting parties.6 It is also described as a political legal system
dealing with the mediation of conflicting international economic in-
terests which generally have an enormous impact on political deci-
sions.7 The mediation of these conflicting interests is not always
based on a pure legal strategy,8 but is often approached pragmati-
cally with a goal of achieving consensus between the parties. This
may even include tolerance of deviation from certain provisions of
the GATT. Flexibility and pragmatism are, therefore, characteristic
elements of the GATT legal order.
The element of flexibility is set forth in the General Agreement
itself, which contains a great variety of exemptions from its provi-
sions.9 These exemptions enable the contracting parties to deviate
from almost every obligation under the General Agreement if a su-
perior national interest exists. This interest may be an economic in-
terest, as indicated in article XIX l° (Emergency Action for Imports
of Particular Goods), and in article XII:2 (Restrictions to Safeguard
the Balance-of-Payments), or a non-economic interest, as indicated
in article XX (General Exceptions) and article XXI (Security Excep-
tions). In addition to this the CONTRACTING PARTIES 1' may
grant, according to article XXV:5, any contracting party a waiver
from any provision of the General Agreement.' 2
Pragmatism in the GATT legal system means the resolution of
conflicts by concentrating on the concrete problems at the time they
occur and using the flexible instruments the GATT provides.' 3 One
of the first and most prominent examples of this kind of GATT prag-
(1981). For a brief survey, see Jackson, Economic Law, International, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (Bernhardt ed. 1985).
6 See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 755-63, 147, 213
(1969); R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY vi (1975); 0.
LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 19 (1985).
7 W. BENEDEK, DIE RECHTSORDNUNG DES GAIT AUS V'KERRECHTLICHER SICHT [The
GAIT Legal Order from a Public International Law Perspective] 394 (1989); JACKSON,
supra note 6, at 756.
8 See HUDEC, supra note 6, at vi; Hudec, GATT or GABB?, 80 YALE L.J. 1299 (1971).
9 BENEDEK, supra note 7, at 393.
10 All articles are articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade unless
otherwise indicated.
I I For the use of the term "CONTRACTING PARTIES" written in capital letters, see
GATT, supra note 4, art. XXV ("Wherever reference is made in this agreement to the
contracting parties acting jointly, they are designated as CONTRACTING PARTIES.").
12 The most important waiver currently in force is the indefinite waiver for the United
States Agriculture policy. GATT, 3d Supp. B.I.S.D. 32 (1955) (discussing a waiver granted
to the United States in connection with the import restrictions imposed by the United
States Agricultural Adjustment Act). An updated list of all waivers currently in force can
be found in the index of every supplement of the B.I.S.D. Because of its far reaching
effects, a waiver can be viewed as an amendment of the General Agreement. JACKSON,
supra note 6, at 137; LONG, supra note 6, at 18.
13 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 755.
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matism may be found in the examination of the European Economic
Community (EEC) Treaty' 4 under article XXIV. 15 The 1957 Work-
ing Party' 6 which examined the EEC Treaty did not reach a definite
conclusion, and, therefore, the issue was referred to the Interses-
sional Committee.17 This committee, which also could not achieve a
consensus on the problem, came to the following conclusion:
In the light of these statements and reports, the Committee felt that
it would be more fruitful if attention could be directed to specific
and practical problems, leaving aside for the time being questions of
law and debates about the compatibility of the Rome Treaty with
Article XXIV of the General Agreement. The Committee noted that
the normal procedure of the General Agreement and the techniques
and traditions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES in applying them,
were well adapted to the handling of such problems and suggested
that in the first instance the procedures of Article XXII would be the
most appropriate for this purpose.'
8
Most of the questions left undecided by the Working Party were
solved in the following GATT rounds, were subjects of subsequent
dispute settlement proceedings against the EEC, or simply never oc-
curred in practice.
A second element of the GATT pragmatism is the solution of
each case on its own merits, also described as the case-law approach
of the GATT.19 A third element of the GATT pragmatism is the
allowance of departures from GATT provisions beyond flexibility
and pragmatism, which is known as tolerance. 20 One example of tol-
erance, which will be discussed in detail below, is the imposition of
surcharges in the case of balance-of-payments difficulties, although
article XII:1 allows only quantitative restrictions.
The three mentioned principles of the GATT legal order, flexi-
bility, pragmatism, and tolerance can be explained to a great extent
by the historical development 2' of the GATT legal system.22 The
GATT was framed to become part of the International Trade Organ-
14 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 1, pt. II (Cmd. 5179 II), 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
15 Petersmann, The EEC as a GA TT Member - Legal Conflicts Between GA TT Law and Euro-
pean Community Law, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 23-71 (1986).
16 A Working Party is a temporary GATT body. Working Parties are established with
regard to specific problems, for example the examination of an application for a waiver or
for membership, and also the examination as to whether a customs union or free trade
area fulfills the requirements of article XXIV.
17 GATT, THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY, 6th Supp.
B.I.S.D. 69 (1958). On the Intersessional Committee, see GATE, INTERSESSIONAL PROCE-
DURES, 7th Supp. B.I.S.D. 7-11 (1959).
18 GATT, REPORT BY THE INTERSESSIONAL COMMITTEE, 7th Supp. B.I.S.D. 70 (1959).
19 BENEDEK, supra note 7, at 396.
20 Id. at 394; JACKSON, supra note 6, at 757. For a definition of tolerance, see Gold,
The "Dispensing" and "Suspending" Powers of International Organizations, 19 NEDERLANDS TUD-
SCHRIFT VOOR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 181 (1972).
21 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 756.
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ization (ITO).23 However,, the establishment of the ITO fell through
after United States President Harry S. Truman failed to submit the
Havana Charter 24 to Congress for ratification. The GATT was left
alone and somewhat unprepared for its tasks. Its "indirect way of
doing things" 25 and its "blend of legal and diplomatic strategies" 26
have contributed substantially to the success of the GATT.
These elements of the GATF legal system may also be seen
from a critical point of view as dangerous and as a source of potential
erosion of the GATT legal order. They contradict basic elements
inherent in every legal system: predictability and stability.27 While
the GAT continues to develop into an "established" institution,
predictability and stability of the GATT law become more important.
During the current Uruguay Round, the CONTRACTING PARTIES
are attempting to strengthen the GAIT legal system and the rule of
law in GATT through, for example, an improvement of the dispute
settlements procedures.28
The concept of the GATT system as a system governed by the
rule of law has particular importance with regard to the constitu-
tional function of the GATT and its status in the national law of the
contracting parties. For example, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Community, in its famous opinion in Third International Fruit
Company v. Produktshap voor Groenten en Fruit,29 denied the General
Agreement the status of a self-executing treaty because of the gen-
eral structure and the flexibility of the GATT legal system.30
22 For a detailed description of the history of GATT, see DAM, supra note 1, at 10-16;
HUDEC, supra note 6, at 3-18.
23 International Trade Organization of the United Nations.
24 The full name of the Charter is The Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization. The text of the Charter is reprinted in C. WILcox, A CHARTER FOR WORLD
TRADE app. 231-327 (1949) (hereinafter Havana Charter).
25 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 147.
26 HUDEC, supra note 6, at vi.
27 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 756.
28 See GATT, IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GAT'T DISPUTE SETrLEMENT RULES AND PROCE-
DURES, Doc. MTN.TNC/I 1, at 24 (adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES during the
mid-term review conference of the Uruguay Round).
29 1972 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1219, 1228. Also see the pleading of General Advocate
Hayra. Id., at 1241. The court last reaffirmed this decision in three judgments of March
16, 1983: Societi Italiana per l'Oleodotto Transalpino (SlOT) v. Ministero delle Finanze,
Ministero della Marina Mercantile, Circorscrizione doganale di Trieste and Ente Anfto-
nomo del Porto di Trieste, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731; Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato v. Societi Petrolifera Italiana S.p.A. (SPI) and S.p.A. Michelin Italiana (SAMI)
1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 801; Compagnia Singer S.p.A. and Geigy S.p.A. v. Amministra-
zione delle Finanze dello Stato, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 847.
30 However, two recent judgments of the court suggest that the court might change
its position. Fediol v. Commission, 1989 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1781; Nakjima v. Council,
1991 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. - (not yet reported).
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B. The law-creative effect of subsequent GA TT practice3 '
The purpose of this Article is to examine whether subsequent
practice in the GATT, the pragmatic approach of the GATT, and its
frequent tolerance of deviation from its provisions have caused the
derogation of GAT provisions and led to the establishment of new
GATT law. These possible effects of subsequent GATT practice
were examined by Jackson 32 and Dam 33 almost twenty years ago and
have recently become more important and relevant to the discussion
about the status of the EEC in the GATT. 34
This Article will first discuss the general possibility that subse-
quent practice to international treaties, with a special emphasis on
international organizations, can result in the creation of law. It will
then evaluate the premises for the establishment of law through sub-
sequent practice in GATT and examine some examples in the GAT
practice.
II. International treaties and subsequent practice
A. The different forms of law-creating force of subsequent practice to
international treaties3 5
The absence of any formal requirements is a significant element
of public international law.3 6 Formal requirements are actually con-
sidered an obstacle to the development of new international rules. 3 7
Therefore, an international treaty which is formally concluded can be
derogated not only through the establishment of a later treaty, but
also through rules which emerge from other sources of international
law. The theory of acte contraire has no validity in international law.38
Three different interpretations of subsequent practice to an in-
ternational treaty could lead to the conclusion that new law has been
created. 39 The subsequent practice might be interpreted as the es-
tablishment of special customary law, an informal silent amendment
to the treaty, or a result of estoppel. 40 However, these interpreta-
31 For the purpose of this Article, subsequent practice to an international treaty is
understood as the open deviation from an international treaty in its application by the
contracting parties or the entities established by the treaty.
32 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 757.
33 DAM, supra note 1, at 166.
34 See Petersmann, supra note 15, at 37-53.
35 The effects of subsequent practice to international treaties have been studied
extensively in a recent treatise by W. KARL, VERTRAG UND SPATERE PRAXIS IM
V6LKERRECHT (1983) (includes English summary at 377-93). See also J. MOLLER,
VERTRAUENSSCHUTZ IM V6LKERRECHT (1971).
36 KARL, supra note 35, at 380.
37 Pescatore, Introduction, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT xvi (1986).
38 KARL, supra note 35, at 380.
39 Id. at 246. Forms of subsequent practice other than open deviation can also be
considered as a factor of interpretation. Id. at 214.
40 Id. at 246.
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tions are not mutually exclusive; rather, the distinction between the
three is blurred, and sometimes the establishment of new law can be
explained by referring to more than one of them. 41
These different interpretations of the effects of subsequent prac-
tice have been examined in several opinions of the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ) 42 and the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ),4 3 as well as in judgments of other tribunals. 4 4 In the USA-
France Air Arbitration45 case, the law-creating force of subsequent
practice has perhaps been developed most clearly. The arbitration
tribunal stated:
This course of conduct may, in fact, be taken into account not
merely as a means of use for interpreting the Agreement, but also as
something more: that is a possible source of a subsequent modifica-
tion, arising out of certain actions or certain attitudes, having a bear-
ing on the judicial situation of the Parties and on the rights that each
of them could properly claim.
4 6
1. Customary international law
Article 38:1 (b) of the Statute of the ICJ mentions customary in-
ternational law as a source of international law, but does not define
customary international law. The dominant doctrine on the estab-
lishment of customary international law, however, requires an ongo-
ing practice based on opinio juris, which means that the participants
had the subjective intention to establish such law.4 7
In its classical form this doctrine requires a prolonged practice,
but some authors have developed theories of "instant customary
law," or "coutume sauvage. '' 48 According to them, the most impor-
tant element of customary law is the clear establishment of opinio
juris, and ongoing practice is not necessary: "Where there is opinio
41 Id.
42 Serbian Loans (Fr. v. Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovens) 1929 P.C.IJ. (ser. A)
No. 20, at 38 (July 12).
43 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) 1962 I.CJ. 6, 23 (hereinafter
Temple Case); Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116, 139 (hereinafter Fishery
Case); North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den. / W. Germany v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3,
26 (hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf Case); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) 1964 I.CJ. 6, 24 (preliminary objections).
44 See, e.g., Air Transp. Serv. Agreement Arbitration (USA v. France) 38 I.L.R. 182,
249 (1969) (award of 22 January 1963) (hereinafter USA-France Air Arbitration).
45 Id. For a discussion of the case, see KARL, supra note 35, at 232-40; B6ckstiegel,
France-United States Air Transport Arbitration (1963), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw, Vol. 2, at 101 (1981).
46 USA-France Air Arbitration, supra note 44, at 249.
47 See Cheng, Custom: The Future of the General State Practice in a Divided World, in THE
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE
AND THEORY 513 (1983); VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 2, at 345-59; 1. BROWNLIE, PRIN-
CIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 4-11 (4th ed. 1990).
48 Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary
Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 35-40 (1965).
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juris, there is a rule of customary international law."'49 However, the
notion of customary law without custom seems to be contradictory;50
and, therefore, it might be more appropriate to interpret the exist-
ence of opiniojuris without custom as an informal agreement through
implied consent.5 1
In addition to customary law which is effective generally, there
can be customary law which is effective among a limited number of
states or other subjects of international law. These states or subjects
can be specified by region, 52 or by their status as parties to an inter-
national agreement. The opinion of the ICJ in the Right of Passage
case 53 even suggests the possibility of bilateral customary law. 54
International customary law can lead to the derogation of an in-
ternational treaty, as well as to the establishment of new rules. Be-
cause customary law and formal treaty law are of equal rank, the
general conclusion is that the ex posterior rule applies; the later-en-
acted law would have precedent. 5 5
The derogation of a treaty through the development of custom-
ary law is called desuetude, 56 which can be described as the break-
down of a treaty or treaty provision because of continued, open non-
application. Also, in some cases the effect of desuetude can be the
creation of a new rule replacing the treaty provision. 57
The basic element of desuetude is the non-application of the
treaty by the parties to, or organs of, the treaty. 58 It may be, but
does not have to be, accompanied and supported by an explicit
claim. Non-application of a treaty can also occur in the form of non-
exercise of treaty rights by a party. 59 However, this alone can never
lead to the loss of a right of a party. 6° A loss of a right is only possi-
ble if it has been waived, or if the elements of estoppel are present. 6 '
Another element of desuetude is opinio juris of the parties; the
parties must have the opinion that the treaty or its relevant provi-
49 Id. at 36.
50 VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 2, at 361-62, 358-59.
51 See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
52 Asylum (Colum. v. Peru) 1950 I.CJ. 266, 276-78 (discussing possibility of custom-
ary law arising among Latin-American states).
53 Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India) 1960 I.CJ. 6,
39 ("The Court sees no reason why long continued practice between two states accepted
by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obliga-
tions between the two states.").
54 KARL, supra note 35, at 266; VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 2, at 569.
55 KARL, supra note 35, at 380, 386.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 257-60, 386.
58 Id. at 266.
59 Id. at 264. See also Giraud, Modification et Terrminaison des Traitis Collectifs, 49 AN-
NUANRE DE L'INsTiT'r DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 52 (1961).
60 KARL, supra note 35, at 264.
61 Id. See also Giraud, supra note 59, at 60.
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sions should no longer be applied. 62 A third element of desuetude is
the time period involved,63 although desuetude can lead to the un-
dermining of a treaty even in a relatively short period of time.
2. Informal treaty amendment through silent consent
The absence of formal requirements in international treaty law
allows the conclusion, modification, and termination of a treaty
through informal agreement. However, an agreement of the parties
to an international treaty to amend the treaty requires an expression
of their intent.6 This can be accomplished explicitly, or silently
through non-reaction to an action or claim of another party.
The term "acquiescence" is used to describe the situation in
which the silence of one party is interpreted as an indication of con-
sent, thus leading to the establishment of a rule of law.65 Silence of
the party is perceived to be an agreement with the actions and the
claims of another party and their legal implications. The notion of
acquiescence is generally accepted in international law.66
The establishment of law through acquiescence rests on two
premises. First, the silent state must have had knowledge of the ac-
tions and claims of the other state. It is not necessary that this be
positive knowledge. Rather, it is sufficient that the party have had
constructive knowledge of the actions of the other state; that is, it
could not have ignored such actions if it had been properly caring for
its affairs. 67 Second, the silent state's interest must be such that the
other state would expect a reaction to its claims. 68 The time factor is
not of significant importance. Nevertheless, a longer period of si-
lence can support the inference of acquiescence. 69
It is important to note that a result of acquiescence can be the
62 KARL, supra note 35, at 262.
63 Id. at 262-63, 387. See also A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 516 (1961) ("[b]y
desuetude is meant not only mere lapse of time, however long, but discontinuance of the
use of, and resort to, a treaty or acquiescence in such discontinuance.").
64 KARL, supra note 35, at 368.
65 Acquiescence was developed in the Anglo-American legal system as a particular
form of estoppel called estoppel by conduct, but has taken its own development as an
institute of international law. See MOLLER, supra note 35, at 38.
66 Id. at 35-37; McGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 31 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 142, 182-86 (1954); Miller & Cottier, Acquiescence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw, Vol. 7, at 5 (1984). See also Temple Case, supra note 43, at 23; Fish-
ery Case, supra note 43, at 139.
67 Fishery Case, supra note 43, at 139 ("As a coastal State on the North Sea ... the
United Kingdom could not have been ignored of the Decree of 1869 ..."); KARL, supra
note 35, at 279; MOLLER, supra note 35, at 41; McGibbon, supra note 66, at 182-83; Fitz-
maurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of justice, 1951-54: General Principles
and Sources of Law, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 35-42 (1953).
68 Fishery Case, supra note 43, at 139; MOLLER, supra note 35, at 40-41; KARL, supra
note 35, at 279.
69 McGibbon, supra note 66, at 143 ("[Tlhe presumption of consent which may be
raised by silence is strengthened in proportion to the length of period during which the
silence is maintained.").
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derogation of a formal treaty. This can be deduced from the intent
of the parties to derogate the treaty, or with the use of the lex posterior
rule, which applies to the relation of formal and informal sources of
international law.70
Acquiescence can occur between two subjects of international
law, and also among a group, such as the parties to an international
treaty or the member states of an international organization. How-
ever, the derogation of a multilateral treaty through informal con-
sent, whether explicitly or by acquiescence, requires an agreement of
all parties.7' In some cases, it is possible to have an inter se amend-
ment to a treaty among those contracting parties which have ex-
pressed an intention to comply. However, this sort of amendment
may not infringe upon the rights of other contracting parties. 72
3. Estoppel
The principle of estoppel, which originated in the English com-
mon law system, 7 3 is accepted as a basic principle of international
law. 74 However, there is not yet agreement on the precise concept
or source of estoppel in international law.
75
Estoppel consists of two elements. First, it requires a clear, un-
ambiguous 76 explicit or implicit statement or specific action by one
party. 77 Second, the other party must then have relied in good faith
on this statement and have risked some sort of damage or disadvan-
tage if the first party were to change its position. 78
The effect of estoppel is that the first party is precluded from
changing its position; it is bound to its former statement. 79 With re-
gard to subsequent treaty practice, it is worth noting that a party
which has given its opinion on the interpretation of a treaty provision
can be bound to this interpretation through estoppel, whether or not
the interpretation is correct.80
70 KARL, supra note 35, at 279.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 282.
73 Miller & Cottier, Estoppel, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 7,
at 79 (1984); see also KARL, supra note 35, at 324.
74 MCNAIR, supra note 63, at 485; Miller & Cottier, supra note 73, at 78; KARL supra
note 35, at 324-37, 390. See also North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 43, at 26 ("it
appears to the Court that only the existence of a situation of estoppel could suffice to lend
substance to this contention..."); Temple Case, supra note 43, at 39-46 (individual opin-
ion of Alfaro, J.).
75 For a brief discussion, see Miller & Cottier, supra note 73, at 79.
76 KARL, supra note 35, at 329, 390.
77 Id. at 326, 390.
78 Id. at 328-37, 390; Miller & Cottier, supra note 73, at 78.
79 KARL, supra note 35, at 326, 390.
80 Id. at 326.
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4. Subsequent practice and special amendment and termination
clauses
Subsequent practice can lead to the derogation of a treaty or
some of its provisions. One of the reasons for this is the absence of
formal requirements in international law. However, some treaties
contain provisions which set forth specific formal rules for amend-
ment and termination, as found in article XXX of the GATT. The
question is whether such a provision would affect the possibility of
derogation through subsequent practice.
For the answer to this question it is helpful to look at the reasons
behind such provisions. Generally, their purpose is to facilitate an
amendment to a treaty by providing alternatives to and suggesting
possibilities other than amendment by consent of the parties.8 '
They do not intend, however, to exclude the latter alternative; an
amendment through consent remains possible.8.2 However, even in
a situation in which such provisions are meant to exclude any other
form of amendment, the parties to the treaty still could derogate the
treaty through subsequent practice. This is because there is nothing
in such provisions to prevent the parties to the treaty from changing
their former position.83
5. Opinio juris as the common element of the interpretation of
subsequent practice as a law-creating force
All of the above interpretations of subsequent practice have in
common the requirement of some sort ofopiniojuris for the deroga-
tion of a treaty or the establishment of a new rule. Thus, the parties
must intend to create a new rule with binding character. As will be
shown, this element of any interpretation of subsequent practice in
GAT is the most crucial one. There is a general tendency in inter-
national law to develop non-binding rules rather than legally binding
rules. 84 Roessler calls these non-binding rules de facto agreements,
which are distinct from de jure agreements, and defines them as
"declarations intended to give ground to expect performance or for-
bearance of actions without creating legal rights and obligations. ' 8 5
81 For a detailed analysis, see id. at 340-52, 390-91.
82 Id. at 344.
83 Id. at 345. The only exemptions are cases in which this could affect rights of third
parties under the treaty.
84 Roessler, Law, De Facto Agreements and Declarations of Principle in International Economic
Relations, 21 GER. Y.B. Irr'L L. 27, 40-56 (1978).
85 Id. at 28, 41.
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B. Subsequent practice and constitutional treaties of international
organizations
1. General Observations
Treaties establishig public86 international organizations are
special forms of multilateral international treaties.8 7 Therefore, it is
generally acceptable to transfer the principles of subsequent practice
mentioned above to international organizations. However, agree-
ments establishing international organizations differ from other mul-
tilateral treaties due to their constitutional character.88 One of the
most important distinguishing characteristics in this regard is that
they can create a new entity which is a subject of international law.89
It is more or less generally accepted that an international organiza-
tion can be a subject of international law if the member states have
expressly or implicitly provided it with legal personality. 90 An exam-
ple of an explicit provision granting international legal personality
can be found in article 210 of the EEC Treaty.91 International orga-
nizations therefore derive their international legal personality from
the member states exercising their national sovereignty. 92
International legal personality gives the international organiza-
tion the ability to act under international law to the extent necessary
to achieve its aims and to pursue its objectives. 93 This legal person-
ality is effective only between the international organization and its
member states, because an international treaty as a res inter alios acta
does not create rights and duties for third states.94 Therefore, the
legal personality can become effective in relation to third states only
if they recognize the international organization. 95 The important
86 Besides public international organizations there are international organizations
established under private law. This Article, however, only deals with public international
organizations.
87 See H. SCHERMERS, INTERNATONAL INsTrrrIoNAL LAW § 1003 (1980).
88 Id. at §§ 1002-51.
89 Id. at § 1004.
90 SEIDL-HOHENFELDERN, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN
EINSCHLIESSLICH DER SUPRANATIONALEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 34-50 (4th ed. 1984);
SCHERMERS, supra note 87, at § 1386; BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 680-83.
91 Seesupra note 14, art. 210-11. By comparison to article 211 of the EEC Treaty, it is
clear that the term "legal personality" in article 210 means legal personality under interna-
tional law.
92 SEIDL-HOHENFELDERN, supra note 90, at 35-37. For a different notion of the nature
of the legal personality of international organizations, see Seyersted, International Personal-
ity of Intergovernmental Organizations, 4 INDIANJ. INT'L L. 1 (1964).
93 But because the international organization derives this ability from the member
states, the member states can limit the ability of the international organization to act under
international law. SEIDL-HOHENFELDERN, supra note 90, at 49-50.
94 Id. at 43-44. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 622-24 (pacta tertils nec nocent nec
prosunt).
95 The United Nations is the only international organization for which an erga omnes
legal personality, or objective legal personality, is accepted. See Advisory Opinion (repara-
tion for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations) 1949 1.CJ. 174, 178-79
(finding that the U.N. has a legal personality).
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concept to keep in mind when examining the law-creating effects of
subsequent practice in international organizations is that constitu-
tional treaties of international organizations do not only create legal
relationships among the member states, but also between the mem-
ber states and the international organization itself. These two rela-
tions must be distinguished if the law-creating effect of subsequent
practice is to be examined.
In addition, constitutional treaties of international organizations
differ from other multilateral treaties because they provide the inter-
national organization, in one way or another, with the ability to set
secondary law. Secondary law is the law of the international organi-
zation which is set up by bodies of the international organization it-
self, whereas primary law is the law set up by the member states. 96
Most international organizations have power to set up secondary law
only in the field of internal procedural rules.
2. General acceptance of the law-creating force of subsequent
practice in international organizations
It is generally accepted that it is possible for law to be created
through subsequent practice in international organizations. 97 How-
ever, the discussion of this phenomenon focuses almost entirely on
the possibility of the creation of customary international law, leaving
aside the other possibilities mentioned above.
There are two forms of customary law in international organiza-
tions: general customary law, which is applicable to every interna-
tional organization, and particular special customary law, which is
applicable only within one particular international organization. An
example of the latter is the right of a body of an international organi-
zation to decide for itself the scope of its competences98 if the treaty
does not contain any special applicable provisions.99
Almost every example of the establishment of particular custom-
ary law within an international organization is based on deviation
from provisions of the treaty by member states or bodies of the inter-
national organization and the fact that no possible action has been
taken against them. The establishment of this form of customary law
often happens much more rapidly than the establishment of a rule of
general customary international law.' 00 One explanation for this re-
96 See generally SEIDL-HOHENFELDERN, supra note 90, at 217-72; SCHERMERS, supra note
87, at § 936 (use of the terms "contractual law making" and "legislative law making").
97 See SCHERMERS, supra note 87, at § 1192, and the examples in §§ 211, 324, 722,
1235; SEIDL-HOHENFELDERN, supra note 90, at 222-25; KARL, supra note 35, at 96; with
regard to the specialized agencies of the United Nations, see C.H. ALEXANDROVICZ, THE
LAW-MAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 98 (1973).
98 SCHERMERS, supra note 87, § 324.
99 For another example, see id. § 211.
100 Id. § 1192; ALEXANDROVICZ, supra note 97, at 98.
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suit is the limited number of participants.
An example of this kind of internal customary international law
can be found in the International Monetary Fund (IMF),' 0 ' which
goes beyond the creation of internal procedural rules. In 1971, a
fundamental change in the international exchange system occurred
when exchange rates between the major currencies became floating.
This practice was clearly inconsistent with the provisions of the IMF
Statute in force at the time, 10 2 which contemplated a system of fixed
exchange rates. However, it was supported by all participants, and
included a decision of the IMF Executive Directors.' 03 The new sys-
tem was not formally incorporated into the IMF Statute until
1976.104 It can be argued that the old provisions had already dimin-
ished in force before this formal incorporation because of continuing
non-application. 10 5 Another possibility is that the new practice had
become binding as customary law.' 0 6
III. The GATT
A. Some particularities about the establishment of law in the GA TT
The CONTRACTING PARTIES are the GATT body with the
principal power to set up new GATT rules by adopting secondary
GATT law. 10 7 They derive their power from article XXV: 1, which
allows them to take any action with the aim of facilitating the opera-
tion or furthering the objectives of the GATF.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES have made use of their power
to set secondary law, especially in the field of internal procedural
law. The most important decision in this regard was certainly the
establishment of the Council in 1960.108 The fact that most of the
secondary law consists of procedural rules is due to the drafting of
the GATT as "merely a trade agreement with a few procedural provi-
sions,"' 1 9 so that the United States administration could adopt the
101 For a detailed analysis of this internal customary international law, see
Petersmann, V'l/kerrechtliche Fragen der Weltwahrungsreform-Wirtschaftliche Dynamik als V6'ker-
rech sproblem in der Praxis des Internationalen Wahrungsfonds, 34 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSIAJNDIS-
CHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 452 (1974); Gold, supra note 20, at 181.
102 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended July 28, 1969, 20 U.S.T.
2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726 U.N.T.S. 266 (formally incorporated into the IMF Statute in
1976) (hereinafter IMF Statute).
Io3 Central Rates and Wider Margins: A Temporary Regime, 1972 IMF Ann. Rep. 85,
Doc. No. 3463 (December 18, 1971).
104 See IMF Statute, supra note 102.
105 KARL, supra note 35, at 232; Gold, supra note 20, at 182-84.
106 Petersmann, supra note 101, at 496.
107 See generally Roessler, The Competence of GATT, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 73 (1987)
(hereinafter Roessler, Competence).
108 GATT, 9th Supp. B.I.S.D. 8-9 (1961).
109 Roessler, supra note 84, at 47.
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GATT without seeking the approval of Congress."10
The last time the CONTRACTING PARTIES extensively used
their power to set up secondary law was the adoption of four impor-
tant decisions at the end of the Tokyo Round."' These decisions
dealt not only with internal procedural rules, but also with general
GATT law. With regard to the "enabling clause," some contracting
parties argued that this decision had such far reaching effects that it
should have been implemented through a formal amendment to the
General Agreement according to article XXX.112
Unfortunately, the GATT does not set up any specific formal
requirements for the adoption of secondary law'13 other than, for
example, the EEC Treaty.' 14 Therefore, it is often difficult to distin-
guish clearly between what is merely general practice of a GATT
body and what is the setting of secondary law.
However, the GATT bodies, especially the Council and the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, are not only setting GATT law; they are
also interpreting GAIT law.' '5 This unification of the legislature
and judiciary in one body has an important impact on the perception
of the quality of secondary law. It is within the power of the GATT
bodies to deviate from every formerly set rule simply by agreeing on
and setting up a new rule. This is particularly important with regard
to internal procedural rules.
The particularities of the GATT legal order discussed above in-
fluence the analysis of the question of under which premises subse-
quent practice in GATT can lead to the establishment of new law.
First, the question of whether activities, statements, and decisions of
GATT bodies are subsequent practice or the setting of secondary
law must be carefully examined. Second, if the establishment of law
through subsequent practice can be proved, the quality of this law
must be examined. For example, could the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES, or any other GATT body, derogate this law with a simple deci-
sion? This must not always be the case, because subsequent practice
110 Id. at 48; JACKSON, supra note 6, at 120-22; Jackson, The General Agreement of Taiffs
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 254-55 (1968).
1 11 GATF, 26th Supp. B.I.S.D. 201-15 (1980). The four decisions adopted in Novem-
ber 1979 are: "Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Partici-
pation of Developing Countries" ("enabling clause"); "Declaration on Trade Measures
Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes" (hereinafter B-O-P Declaration); "Safeguard
Action for Development Purposes"; and "Understanding Regarding Notification, Consul-
tation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance" (hereinafter Understanding).
112 E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, GATT, THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 29 (2d ed. 1986).
113 BENEDEK, supra note 7, at 125.
114 See supra note 14, arts. 189-90.
115 Their power to interpret GATT law follows from the fact that the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES, or 'in actuality the Council acting for the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES, adopt the Panel reports as well as the reports of the Working Parties. Hence, they
have the final decision on any interpretation of GATF law.
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could lead to a derogation of the General Agreement itself, that is,
primary GATT law, and would therefore rank higher than secondary
law."16
B. Examples of possible creation of law through subsequent practice in
GA TT
1. The dispute settlement procedure
The General Agreement regulates the settlement of disputes
fragmentarily," t 7 in articles XXII and XXIII. However, the GAT
has subsequently developed a dispute settlement mechanism under
which most of the disputes are settled through a panel procedure." 18
This method of dispute settlement is not provided for in the relevant
GAIT articles; it has developed through custom. After more than
fifty panel procedures, this system was finally codified in the Under-
standing" 19 adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES at the end of
the Tokyo Round. Therefore, the Understanding is a codification of
a system which developed out of custom and was established as cus-
tomary law. 120
However, it is doubtful that this later codified procedure estab-
lished as customary law gives a contracting party the right to a panel
in every case. It has been the usual practice that decisions in the
GAT, including Council decisions concerning the establishment of
a panel, are adopted through consensus.' 2 1 Although a contracting
party, therefore, could prevent the establishment of a panel against it
by opposing a Council decision, it has been ongoing practice that the
repeated request for a panel leads, finally, to its establishment. 122
This ongoing practice could suggest the possibility of a rule of cus-
tomary law: a party has a right to a panel if repeatedly requested.
But the wording of paragraph 10 of the Understanding suggests that
the CONTRACTING PARTIES did not consider this custom to be a
rule of law. 123 Thus, because of this lack of opiniojuris among the
contracting parties, there is no rule of customary law in the GATT
giving a party the right to a panel upon request.
116 GATT, supra note 4, arts. XXII, XXIII.
117 This might be due to the fact that the GATT was drafted as a trade agreement and
not as an international organization.
118 For an analysis of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, see DAM, supra note 1,
at 351-56; Lacharriere, Case for a Tribunal to Assist in Settling Disputes, 8 WORLD ECONOMY 339
(1985).
119 See McGOVERN, supra note 112, at 29.
120 Lacharriere, supra note 118, at 339; Carreau, supra note 5, at 285; Jackson, The
Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 755
(1978).
121 See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text for additional detail.
122 Understanding, supra note I 1, at 212.
123 See B-O-P Declaration, supra note 111, at 212. Paragraph ten reads: 'the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES would decide .. " Id. (emphasis added).
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2. Decision-making by consensus
The GATT considers the possibility of decision-making by ma-
jority voting. In fact, according to the wording of the GATF, major-
ity voting is the generally applicable form of decision-making. 124
However, the CONTRACTING PARTIES follow this rule only in
those cases where voting is mandatory.' 2 5 In practice decisions are
made by consensus, and in cases of mandatory voting, the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES generally have reached consensus on the
matter in question before-hand.
The principle of consensus gains particular importance with re-
gard to the dispute settlement procedure in the GATF. It has al-
ready been mentioned that a panel is only established if consensus is
reached in the Council.' 26 It has also been ongoing practice that the
Council adopts the panel report by consensus, which includes the
two parties of the dispute. 12 7 The same is true for the adoption of
the reports of working parties.128 This ongoing practice of decision-
making through consensus, rather than by majority decision, could
have led to the derogation of article XXV. However, there are two
arguments against this assumption.
First, the practice of decision-making through consensus was
once interrupted without the objection of any contracting party.' 29
In the preparatory phase of the launching of the Uruguay Round,
some developing countries tried to block the discussion in the Coun-
cil in order to achieve favorable results. The United States, which
was unsatisfied with this development, requested the calling of a spe-
cial session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The formal provi-
sions for the calling of a special session of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES require a written ballot.' 30 The CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES followed this procedure and the session was called after a sim-
ple majority was reached.
The second argument is the stronger one. As mentioned above,
the important element of any explanation of law established by sub-
sequent practice is the fact that the participating states must consider
that, or have the opinio juris that, the deviation of the treaty is law.
This is true for desuetude as well as for acquiescence. It is doubtful
124 LONG, supra note 6, at 54.
125 For these situations, see GATT, supra note 4, art. XXX:I (Amendments); art.
XXV:5 (Joint Action by the Contracting Parties; waiver decisions); and art. XXXIII (Acces-
sion of new contracting parties).
126 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
127 LONG, supra note 6, at 77.
128 Id.
129 See BENEDEK, supra note 7, at 234; Annual Report of the Council to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES, GATT Doc. L/5909 (1985).
130 GATT, 12th Supp. B.I.S.D. 10 (1964).
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that opiniojuris can be proved with regard to the principle of consen-
sus in the GATT.
In a footnote to the Understanding, the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES made clear that, despite their ongoing practice to adopt deci-
sions concerning dispute settlements by consensus, they still
consider the possibility of recourse to article XXV and the use of
majority voting. 13' An even clearer statement can be found in the
provisions concerning dispute settlements adopted at the midterm
review of the Uruguay Round: "The practice of adopting panel re-
ports by consensus shall be continued, without prejudice to the
GAIT provisions on decision-making which remain applicable."' 132
These two statements strongly suggest that there is no opinio juris
among the contracting parties concerning the principle of decision-
making by consensus. It seems to be that the contracting parties
have agreed on this form of decision-making simply because they
consider it to be the most effective one. The advantage of the con-
sensus principle is that it forces the contracting parties to achieve
solutions which are acceptable to all parties.133 Although such a so-
lution might not always be the best one and will almost certainly take
more time to achieve, the fact that is acceptable to every party makes
its implementation more likely. The consensus principle also offers
the developing countries an opportunity to achieve more recognition
of their interests. However, this principle depends to a great extent
on the will of the contracting parties to reach a mutually satisfying
solution.' 3 4 Therefore, it does not give the contracting parties a de
facto or dejure veto right.135 The lack of opiniojuris permits the con-
clusion that the ongoing practice of adopting decisions by consensus
has not derogated the GATT provisions for decision-making by ma-
jority voting.
3. Surcharges as a trade measure in balance-ofpayment
difficulties
The GAIT contemplates the possibility that contracting parties
will need to adopt restrictive trade measures because of balance-of-
payments difficulties. Article XII: I provides that a contracting party
is entitled to impose quantitative restrictions "in order to safeguard
its external financial position and its balance-of-payments."' 36
131 The footnote to the Understanding reads as follows: "It is noted that Art. XXV
may ... also afford an appropriate avenue for consultation and dispute settlement in cer-
tain circumstances."
132 See supra note 28, at 30.
133 For the advantages and disadvantages of the consensus principle in GATT, see
generally LONG, supra note 6, at 55-56; BENEDEK, supra note 7, at 187.
134 For a description of the methods used by the contracting parties to achieve consen-
sus, see LONG, supra note 6, at 55-56.
135 Id. at 55.
136 GAIT, supra note 4, art. XII:A.
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Measures other than quantitative restrictions are not foreseen.
However, during the 1960s contracting parties had frequently
imposed surcharges or import deposits instead of quantitative re-
strictions to solve their balance-of-payment problems.13 7 Surcharges
as well as import deposits imposed by a contracting party relating to
items bound by a GATF schedule of concessions of this party are a
violation of article II:1(b) unless they are sanctioned by a waiver.' 3 8
There is no single case in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES
or one single contracting party has taken any action against
surcharges or import deposit requirements as such. The imposition
of these measures instead of quantitative restrictions has simply been
tolerated.' 3 9 This might be due to the fact that there is a general
consensus among economists that they have a less disturbing effect
than quantitative restrictions.140
This raises the question whether the toleration of surcharges
and import deposits has led to their legalization. As Dam has
pointed out with regard to the general abuse of quantitative restric-
tions, "[w]hen violations can be listed, one after the other, for more
than a hundred pages, the concept of illegality loses whatever normal
connotations it might ever have had."' 14 1 Jackson agrees when he
states that "surcharges have almost de facto' become part of the Gen-
eral Agreement."' 42 Therefore the relevant provision of article
XXII: 1 could have been derogated through desuetude, the establish-
ment of a new rule of customary law. That is, under the premises set
up in article XXII: I a contracting party is not limited to the imposi-
tion of quantitative restrictions as a measure to solve its balance-of-
payment problems; it can also impose surcharges and import depos-
its. Alternatively, this conclusion can be explained through acquies-
cence as the result of the assumption of an informal agreement.
It is safe to say that the ongoing practice element of desuetude
has been fulfilled. However, there is some doubt about the existence
137 See Roessler, The GA TT Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payment Pur-
poses: A Commentary, 12 CASE. W. RES. J. INT'L L. 383 (1980) (hereinafter B-0-P Commen-
tary); Petersmann, Trade Restrictions for Balance-of-Payment Purposes and GATT: Strengthening
the Soft International Law of Balance-of-Payment Adjustment Measures, in FOREIGN DEBTS IN THE
PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 181, 200-01 (Dicke ed. 1986) (here-
inafter B-0-P).
138 Roessler, B-0-P Commentary, supra note 137, at 387; Petersmann, B-0-P, supra note
137, at 200; JACKSON, supra note 6, at 714. This has always been clear for surcharges.
Concerning import deposits it was questionable whether they are a "charge" until a panel
in 1978 decided that they are to be regarded as one type of surcharge. See Roessler, B-0-P
Commentary, supra note 137, at 387.
131) Roessler, B-0-P Commentary, supra note 137, at 388; JACKSON, supra note 6, at 711-
14.
140 Roessler, B-0-P Commentary, supra note 137, at 388; Petersmann, B-0-P, supra note
137, at 200; JACKSON, supra note 6, at 711.
141 DAM, supra note 1, at 166.
142 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 714.
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of the element of opinio juris among the contracting parties on this
issue. Likewise, it is doubtful whether acquiescence can be estab-
lished, because it also requires a clear indication of the intent of the
contracting parties.
These doubts arise out of the drafting history and the wording
of the B-O-P Declaration 143 adopted at the end of the Tokyo
Round. 144 During the negotiations of the B-O-P Declaration there
was no consensus among the contracting parties on the issue of
whether surcharges and import deposits should be formally legal-
ized.' 45 The B-O-P Declaration itself does not address these meas-
ures directly, but rather indirectly and ambiguously.' 46 On the one
hand, it mentions in the preamble "that restrictive import measures
other than quantitative restrictions have been used for balance-of-
payment purposes,"' 147 and it gives preference to the least disruptive
measures.' 48 On the other hand, the B-O-P Declaration expresses
the intent not to modify the relevant GATT provisions. 149 In other
words, measures other than quantitative restrictions are still consid-
ered to be illegal.' 50 This might lead to the conclusion that the B-O-
P Declaration "both reaffirms their illegality and recognizes them as
the lesser evil."' 5 '
These relatively vague expressions displayed during the negotia-
tion of the B-O-P Declaration, and especially in the B-O-P Declara-
tion itself, are in contradiction to the clear practice of the contracting
parties. This practice undoubtedly indicates that the contracting
parties want to use surcharges and import deposits as balance-of-
payment adjustment measures, and this practice has continued sub-
sequent to the adoption of the B-O-P Declaration.' 52 Also, in every
case before and after the adoption of the B-O-P Declaration, these
measures have been tolerated as possible balance-of-payment adjust-
ment measures by the relevant GATT bodies as well as by the other
contracting parties. Not a single case exists where they have been
attacked as such.
Therefore, it can be concluded that a GATT body could not take
the position that a contracting party has violated its obligations
under the General Agreement because it has imposed surcharges or
143 B-O-P Declaration, supra note 111.
144 Roessler, B-O-P Commentary, supra note 137, at 389-91; Petersmann, B-O-P, supra
note 137, at 201.
145 For the different arguments on this question, see Roessler, B-O-P Commentary, supra
note 137, at 389-91.
146 Id. at 390-91; Petersmann, B-O-P, supra note 137, at 201.
147 B-O-P Declaration, supra note I 11, at 205.
148 Id. at 206.
149 Id.
150 Roessler, B-0-P Commentary, supra note 137, at 390:
151 Id. at 391.
152 See GATT Doc. BOP/R/160; GATT Doc. BOP/W/99.
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import deposits as balance-of-payments adjustment measures under
the premises set out in article XII:I, instead of quantitative restric-
tions. Surcharges and import deposits have become legalized as bal-
ance-of-payments adjustment measures. This is true at least until the
CONTRACTING PARTIES clearly indicate the opposite.
4. Open violations of GA TT obligations
Sometimes contracting parties do openly violate their GATT
obligations, and the contracting party whose rights are affected does
not take any action, such as requesting a dispute settlement proce-
dure. This non-exercise of possible rights under GATT could lead
to a loss of those rights, especially under the doctrine of estoppel.
The Panel examined this question in a 1982 dispute settlement
procedure between Hong Kong and the EEC.' 53 In this case Hong
Kong complained about quantitative import restrictions imposed by
France. The restrictions had been in force de jure since 1944, and
Hong Kong had, until recently, never taken any action against them.
The EEC therefore argued that one could not ignore "the law-creat-
ing force derived from circumstances" as an important institute of
international law.1 4 The fact that the contracting parties had never
taken any action against the French measures indicated, in the view
of the EEC, that the contracting parties had silently accepted these
measures. 155 However, the Panel did not accept these arguments
and stated:
It would be erroneous to interpret the fact that a measure had not
been subject to Article XXIII over a number of years as tantamount
to its tacit acceptance by contracting parties .... [T]he principle
referred to as 'the law-creating force derived from circumstances'
could be relevant in the absence of law.1 56
This panel decision is supported by the fact that the GATT does
not contain any provision which specifies a period of time in which
contracting parties have to exercise their rights. Therefore, a limita-
tion of the right of Hong Kong to request a panel cannot be con-
strued. There is also no indication that the behavior of Hong Kong
or the contracting parties could raise the notion of estoppel, because
estoppel would have required a clear and unambiguous statement by
Hong Kong that it would not take any action with regard to the
French measures. A mere non-exercise of treaty rights cannot be
interpreted in this way.
A panel decision following the arguments brought forward by
the EEC would have been in some way contradictory to one of the
153 GATT, EEC-QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS AGAINST IMPORTS FROM HONG KONG,
30th Supp. B.I.S.D. 129 (1983).
154 Id. 4 15
155 Id. 44 15, 17, 23.
156 Id. 4 28, 29. The Panel therefore decided in favor of Hong Kong.
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basic principles of the GAT[, which is the intent to look for solu-
tions supported by a broad consensus. It would have necessarily
forced contracting parties into dispute settlement procedures in or-
der not to lose their rights, even if they had not intended to enter
this process. Although, the outcome of such an interpretation of the
GATT might be the strengthening of the rule of law in GATT, which
is probably preferable, it must be noted that this interpretation is not
in accordance with either the current GATT law or the current
GATT practice. It might also lead to a rougher climate in the
GATIT.
5. Non-approval of custom unions and free-trade areas under
article XXIV" 7
Article XXIV contemplates the creation of custom unions and
free-trade areas among contracting parties. If contracting parties in-
tend to establish a custom union or free-trade area they have to no-
tify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and submit a detailed plan,
which will then be examined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES
under the relevant GATT provisions. Article XXIV:7(b) sets forth
the possible actions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES if they find
that the plan is not in accordance with the GATT as follows:
If... the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such an agreement is
not likely to result in the formation of a customs union or a free-
trade area within the period contemplated by the parties to the
agreement or such period is not a reasonable one, the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties
to the agreement.157
Although over fifty customs unions or free-trade areas have
been examined under the GATT, only two have been found to fulfill
the requirements set up in article XXIV:4-8. s58 None of the other
agreements has been approved, but there has never been an explicit
disapproval.
The most prominent example is certainly the examination of the
EEC Treaty.' 59 In this case neither the Working Party' 60 which had
to examine the treaty nor the Intersessional Committee' 6' to which
the matter was referred could agree on the issue. Therefore the
question was simply left open. 62 The working parties which had to
examine the enlargements of the EEC in 1973, 1981, and 1986 were
157 GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIV, § 7(b).
158 GATT, CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET, 24th Supp. B.I.S.D. 68, 72
(1978); GATT, FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND,
14th Supp. B.I.S.D. 122, 123, 127 (1966).
159 See supra note 14.
160 See REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY, supra note 17.
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also unable to reach definite conclusions. 163
This leads to the question of whether the CONTRACTING
PARTIES could still conclude that the EEC Treaty is incompatible
with the GATT and make recommendations to the member states of
the EEC pursuant to article XXIV:7(b); or, did they lose this
right? 164 The problem was raised during the examination of the
1981 enlargement through the accession of Greece to the EEC. One
member of the Working Party stated: "However, the compatibility
of the Treaty of Rome itself with the provisions of the General
Agreement remained an open question since the Working Party
which had examined the Treaty had not reached any final conclu-
sions in this regard."' 165 The representative of the EEC had a differ-
ent opinion on this question: "The EC did not share the view that
these earlier treaties constituted an open question or that their legal
status was unresolved in GATT since the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES had formulated no recommendations under Article XXIV:7(b)
for any modifications to those arrangements."'' 66
The fact that the CONTRACTING PARTIES did not make rec-
ommendations with regard to the examination of a customs union or
a free-trade agreement pursuant to article XXIV:7(b) was the subject
of a 1982 dispute settlement procedure. This case concerned the
EEC tariff treatment on imports of citrus products from certain Med-
iterranean countries.' 67 The EEC had concluded preferential agree-
ments with several Mediterranean countries granting special tariff
concessions for the import of citrus products. These agreements
had been presented to the GATT as interim agreements leading to
the establishment of a free-trade area. The Working Party which had
examined them in light of the provisions of article XXIV:4-8 had not
reached a consensus on this matter, and therefore had not made any
recommendation pursuant to article XXIV:7(b). The Panel had to
decide, among other questions, whether the issue of the compatibil-
ity of these agreements with the GATT is still an open question. The
Panel concluded: "[t]he agreements had not been disapproved, nor
163 The 1973 Working Party could not even agree on a final report. GATT Doc.
C/M/107, at 4. For reports of the other working parties, see GATF, ACCESSION OF
GREECE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 30th Supp. B.I.S.D. 168 (1983) (hereinafter AC-
CESSION OF GREECE).
164 This question has been raised by E. U. Petersmann. See E. Petersmann, Participation
of the European Communities in GA TT: International Law and Community Law Aspects, in MIXED
AGREEMENTS 185 (1983).
165 See ACCESSION OF GREECE, supra note 163, at 174 (1983). A similar statement was
made by Japan in an earlier Council meeting: "The fact that the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES did not pursue the legal issue concerning the community's status with regard to the
requirements of Article XXIV did not prejudice any contracting party's rights and obliga-
tions under the General Agreement." GATT Doc. C/M/61, at 6.
166 See ACCESSION OF GREECE, supra note 163, at 175.
167 GATT Doc. L/5778. The Panel report has not yet been adopted.
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had they been approved."' 168 The Panel found, therefore, that the
question of the conformity of the agreements with the requirements
of article XXIV and their legal status remained open. 169
Therefore, it is possible that the CONTRACTING PARTIES do
not lose their rights if they do not take actions pursuant to article
XXIV:7(b). This leads to the conclusion that the question of the
compatibility of the EEC treaty is still open, and the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES, if they desire, could take actions against the
EEC member states. 170
Any other result would, in fact, be incompatible with the GATT
practice of making decisions in the working parties and adopting
their reports by consensus. The contracting parties who intend to
establish a customs union or a free-trade area can avoid any report
not in their favor, because they are always members of the Working
Party. For example, the EEC had such a strong position that it could
withstand the political pressure of other contracting parties. 171
6. Rectification of schedules172
According to article 11:7, the schedules of concessions of the
contracting parties form an integral part of the GATT.173 There-
fore, their rectification, 174 according to article XXVII, is an amend-
ment of the GATT. Because article II is a provision of part 1 of the
GATT, this amendment to the GATT requires the approval of all
contracting parties according to article XXX: 1.175 In order to modify
the schedules of concessions, the GATT issued nine protocols
through 1959.176 These protocols took several years to come into
effect due to the requirement of approval by every contracting party
and the growing number of contracting parties: for example, the 7th
protocol of November 30, 1957, did not come into force until twelve
years later.177
, This delay was incompatible with the requirements of the praxis.
Therefore, even if rectifications have not been formally in force, the
contracting parties have applied them by means of fiction.' 78 In
1968 the CONTRACTING PARTIES finally adopted a decision, stat-
ing that from then on a simple certification should be sufficient for
168 Id. $ 4.10.
169 Id.
170 This seems more than unlikely.
171 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 579.
172 See Benedek, supra note 7, at 390-94.
173 GATE, supra note 4, art. II.
174 For a description of this process, see JACKSON, supra note 6, at 236.
175 Id. at 237.
176 GATT Doc. GATT/LEG/I, Status of Legal Instruments, at 7-3.7.1 (1973).
177 Id.
178 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 237; Roessler, supra note 84, at 50.
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rectification. 179 Altogether, five of those certifications have been is-
sued,' 80 and they all have been registered at the United Nations
(UN) according to article 102 of the UN Charter.' 8 '
In the beginning of the 1980s, the GATT introduced a looseleaf
form to list the concessions of the parties, which once again changed
the procedure.18 2 Since then, only the publication of the rectifica-
tions of the schedule in the looseleaf edition is necessary.
The extent to which this change in the procedure for rectifica-
tion of schedules has derogated the relevant GATT provisions is
questionable. The change could be regarded merely as the emer-
gence of a de facto agreement with no legal binding character;18 3 or,
it could be viewed as the setting of secondary law. It could also be
interpreted as an informal amendment to the relevant GATT provi-
sions. The two latter interpretations are more appropriate, because
they take into account the fact that the contracting parties apparently
intended to derogate the relevant GATT provisions because they
considered them incompatible with the needs of the praxis. This ar-
gument is supported by the fact that the CONTRACTING PARTIES
originally intended to amend formally the General Agreement in ac-
cordance with article XXX.' 8 4
7. The EEC as a de jure contracting party sui generis
Recently, the problem of the law-creating force of subsequent
practice has been discussed in the Council with regard to the legal
status of the EEC in GATT.' 8 5 It is not possible to address in detail
in this Article the problem of the legal status of the EEC. Briefly
summarized, one can say that most authors interpret the decision of
the Court ofJustice of the EEC in the Third International Fruit Company
179 GATT, PROCEDURES FOR MODIFICATION AND RECTIFICATION, 16th Supp. B.I.S.D.
17-9 (1969).
180 GAF, FIRST CERTIFICATION OF CHANGES TO SCHEDULES TO THE GENERAL AGREE-
MENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, 17th Supp. B.I.S.D. 12 (1970); GATF, SECOND CERTIFICA-
TION OF CHANGES TO SCHEDULES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, 21st
Supp. B.I.S.D. 19 (1975); GATT, THIRD CERTIFICATION OF CHANGES TO SCHEDULES TO THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, 21st Supp. B.I.S.D. 20 (1975); GATT,
FOURTH CERTIFICATION OF CHANGES TO SCHEDULES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TAR-
IFFS AND TRADE, 26th Supp. B.I.S.D. 190 (1980); GATT, FIFTH CERTIFICATION OF CHANGES
TO SCHEDULES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARRIFFS AND TRADE, 8th Supp. B.I.S.D. 10
(1988).
181 BENEDEK, supra note 7, at 134-35; U.N. CHARTER art. 102.
182 GATF, PROCEDURES FOR MODIFICATION AND RECTIFICATION OF TARIFF CONCES-
SIONS, 27th Supp. B.I.S.D. 25-6 (1981). See also GATT, INTRODUCTION OF A LOOSE-LEAF
SYSTEM FOR THE SCHEDULES OF TARIFF CONCESSIONS, 27th Supp. B.I.S.D. 22-4 (1981)
(proposal by the Director-General to implement a loose-leaf system of indexing tariff con-
cessions, rectifications, modifications, and withdrawals).
183 This seems to be the interpretation of Roessler, supra note 84, at 134.
184 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 237.
185 See infra note 187 for sources discussing this topic.
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case 18 6 as holding that the EEC is a de facto member of the
GAFT.18 7 Only Petersmann has suggested the idea that the EEC has
acquired de jure the status as a contracting party sui generis, because
the EEC has in practice taken over the role of the member states in
the GAT almost entirely,' 8 8 and was accepted by the other con-
tracting parties and the GAT itself.' 89 Thus, he concludes that this
subsequent practice had a law-creative effect in that it granted the
EEC de jure status. 190
In a GATF Council meeting in June 1988,19 the EEC agreed to
commit itself to a panel procedure requested by the United States.
France, however, declared, that it was not prepared to go into the
panel procedure' 92 and that therefore the Council has not reached
consensus on this issue. After a discussion of this matter the Direc-
tor General finally concluded "that according to practice established
a number of years earlier, and not just in the council, the representa-
tive of the Community had the authority to commit the Community
to a council decision."' 9 3 He thus stated that there was consensus in
the Council on this matter. None of the other contracting parties
opposed this interpretation of the Director General. This event
clearly supports the assumption that the participation of the EEC in
the GAT, that is, the succession of the member states in practice,
has created legal relationships between the EEC and the GAT, and
between the EEC and the other contracting parties, although the
EEC has never formally acceded to the GAT. This result could be
reached through either the notion of desuetude or, the notion of ac-
quiescence. Another possibility is estoppel, as seen in reference to
the interpretation of the Director General.
8. Other examples
A possible law-creating effect has also been discussed in other
situations. One of these is the function of the GATT Director Gen-
eral. 19 4 Further examples are the de facto waivers for developing
186 See supra note 29.
187 For a detailed evaluation of the subject, see G. BERRISCH, DER VOLKERRECHTLICHE
STATUS DER EUROPAISHEN WIRTSCHAF-rSGEMEINSCHAFT Im GATT (1991). For a brief sur-
vey on the discussion, see Petersmann, supra note 15, at 37-39.
188 According to art. 113 of the EEC Treaty, the Community has exclusive power in
the field of the commercial policy.
189 Since 1973, dispute settlement procedures have no longer been initiated against
the member states but against the EEC, even if they concerned measures of member
states. Also, the EEC, and not the member states, has pursued dispute settlement proce-
dures against other contracting parties.
190 Petersmann, supra note 15, at 37-39. See also, BERRISCH, supra note 187, at 227-33.
191 See GAIT Doc. C/M/222, at 7-17 (1988) (Minutes of Meeting June 16, 1988).
192 Note that under Community law, France had no power to give this declaration.
193 GATT Doc. C/M/222, at 16 (1988).
194 LONG, supra note 6, at 52.
1991]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
countries,' 9 5 and the possibility of a de facto membership for new
independent countries. 19 6
Finally, it is general opinion that the GATT, which was not
drafted as nor intended to be an international organization, has
achieved through customary law the status of an international organ-
ization. 19 7 That is, it has developed in subsequent practice all the
characteristics of an international organization.
IV. Conclusions
Subsequent practice to international treaties in general, and to
constitutional treaties establishing international organizations in par-
ticular, can have a law-creative effect. This occurs in cases where the
subsequent practice raises the notions of desuetude, acquiescence,
or estoppel. The common element of these interpretations of subse-
quent practice is the requirement of some sort of intent or opiniojuris
of the parties to create a binding rule.
Some of the discussed examples of subsequent practice in the
GATT raised the possibility of a law-creative effect. Nevertheless, in
several cases in which a prolonged, ongoing practice of deviation
from provisions of the General Agreement could be proved, a dero-
gation of the relevant GATT provisions could not be concluded. In
these cases, the contracting parties have made clear that they do not
wish to create a new binding rule or give up rights under the General
Agreement, as seen in the example involving the practice to adopt
decisions by consensus and the toleration of custom unions or free-
trade areas.
This result shows that the question of a possible law-creative ef-
fect of the subsequent practice in GATT has to be approached care-
fully. It also supports the assumption that the contracting parties
tend to develop pragmatic rules of non-binding character, defined
above as de facto rules.
195 Frank, The "Graduation" Issue for LDCs, 13J. WORLD TRADE L. 289, 299-300 (1979).
196 BENEDEK, supra note 7, at 196-202.
197 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 120; Roessler, supra note 107, at 81; LONG, supra note 6, at
45; CARREAU, supra note 5, at 258; SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 90, at 345; BENEDEK,
supra note 7, at 250 (with a survey on the literature on this issue).
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